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FIXING THE FARM BILL: USING THE 
“PERMANENT PROVISIONS” IN 
AGRICULURAL LAW TO ACHIEVE  
WTO COMPLIANCE 
Charlene C. Kwan*
Abstract: Agricultural policy in the United States over the past three-
quarters of a century has involved supporting farmers in the unpredict-
able business of growing crops. Until 1973, such domestic supports took 
the form of a loan-based system that controlled crop prices. The current 
payment-based system, put into place after 1973, has encouraged over-
production and run afoul of WTO trade rules. Moving back to a loan-
based system, or incorporating elements of such a system into U.S. agri-
cultural legislation, could potentially cure problems of overproduction 
and other domestic ills. A loan-based system could also bring the United 
States back into alignment with WTO trade rules, protecting it from po-
tentially expensive sanctions by other countries. Furthermore, it is impor-
tant to understand the ramifications of such a loan-based system because 
all farm bills since 1949 are simply modifications to loan-based “perma-
nent provisions,” and in the absence of new legislation, these provisions 
take effect. 
Introduction 
 Regulation of the agricultural sector presents unique challenges to 
lawmakers because farmers face many problems specific to the business 
of growing crops. Traditional understandings of supply and demand 
lose their meaning in the agricultural context because changes in the 
demand for food are limited, but a variety of factors frequently lead to 
wide fluctuations in supply.1 The U.S. Congress began to recognize 
                                                                                                                      
 
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2008–09. 
1 See Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma 54, 94 (2006). Supplies of agricul-
tural products fluctuate because farmers face uncertainties presented by Mother Nature, 
including droughts, pests, and disease. Id. at 94. In contrast, demand stays relatively stable 
because people can only eat a fixed amount of food. See id. at 54. Both the government 
and commodities producers often attempt to alleviate this problem by creating new mar-
kets. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. Daniel Imhoff summed up the agricultural 
supply and demand problem in this way: 
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these difficulties in the 1930s and developed several programs to sup-
port farmers’ needs.2 In 1973, these policies underwent a fundamental 
transition, shifting the focus of legislation from a loan-based system of 
controlling prices to a payment-based system emphasizing production.3 
This change has had far-reaching effects both at home and abroad, 
creating a wide range of domestic problems and violating trade rules 
set by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).4 Though Congress re-
cently passed new agricultural legislation in 2008, it follows the post-
1973 model. Reexamining agricultural policies as they existed before 
1973 may provide insights on how to remedy problems caused by cur-
rent agricultural legislation.5 Moving back to a loan-based system may 
provide hints on how to curb overproduction, remedy domestic ills, 
and prevent future WTO trade violations.6
 This Note attempts to determine whether returning to a pre-1973 
system makes sense from a policy standpoint and whether doing so 
would lead to compliance with WTO trade rules. Part I provides an 
                                                                                                                      
 Rational farmers know that when the price of corn goes down, producing 
less corn to drive prices up is not a real option. They know that their individ-
ual decisions to reduce . . . acres in an effort to balance supply with demand 
will have little effect on supply or price. It will simply reduce their own in-
come. When the price . . . drops, they will produce as much as possible as 
their only defense against economic disaster. Naturally, if the price of corn 
goes up, they will also produce as much as possible to make up for the in-
come lost in leaner times. 
Daniel Imhoff, Foodfight: The Citizen’s Guide to a Food and Farm Bill 9 (2007). 
2 See infra Part I. 
3 See Econ. Research Serv., USDA, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 485, 
History of Agricultural Price-Support and Adjustment Programs, 1933–84, at 29 
(1984), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib485/aib485.pdf. The deci-
sion to emphasize production is logical because feeding its people is one of the most im-
portant things a government can do, both practically and psychologically. See Imhoff, supra 
note 1, at 10 (pointing out that food shortages may cause periods of social unrest). 
4 See infra Parts II–III. This is an extremely important issue because agriculture is an 
especially important sector in virtually every country. Michael J. Shumaker, Tearing the Fab-
ric of the World Trade Organization: United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 32 N.C. J. 
Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 547, 549 (2007). 
5 See Letter from Michael Johanns, Sec’y of Agric., USDA, to House Comm. on Agric. 
(2007) (accompanying USDA, 2007 Farm Bill Proposals) available at http://www.usda. 
gov/documents/07finalfbp.pdf). A large part of the problem may be that overproduction 
is not often seen as a serious issue, especially in light of rising food prices. Andrew Martin, 
Food Prices Expected to Keep Going Up, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2008, at B1. While commodity 
prices have a history of fluctuating widely, this Note focuses on remedying the adverse 
effects of overproduction, which the current system encourages. Clifford Krauss, Commodity 
Prices Tumble, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2008, at B1. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
6 For the purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the United States would be willing to 
decrease its role as the unchallenged leader in crop exports. 
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overview of agricultural policy in the United States, outlining four im-
portant pieces of agricultural legislation—two pre-1973 Acts that make 
up the loan-based “permanent provisions” underlying all American 
farm policy, and two recent payment-based “farm bills” from 1996 and 
2002.7 Part II compares the two basic types of domestic support systems 
used in U.S. agricultural legislation; it also considers the global and 
domestic effects of the transition from a loan-based system to one based 
on payments.8 Part III provides an overview of the WTO dispute resolu-
tion process, explains the WTO trade rules on agricultural subsidies, 
and briefly outlines United States—Upland Cotton, a WTO decision that 
carries important ramifications for American agricultural subsidies and 
trade.9 Part IV considers whether reverting to a pre-1973 loan-based 
agricultural support system provides a viable solution to domestic prob-
lems and promotes WTO compliance.10 This Note concludes that re-
verting to a pre-1973 system—or integrating features of such a system— 
can offer a solution to problems at home and abroad while encourag-
ing compliance with WTO trade rules.11
I. Agricultural Policy in the United States:  
A Historical Overview 
 Congress has implemented legislation regulating agricultural pro-
duction in the United States for over three-quarters of a century.12 This 
“farm bill” legislation generally includes provisions covering a wide va-
riety of programs, including food stamp and nutrition programs, re-
search and education, conservation, food safety, trade and foreign food 
                                                                                                                      
7 See infra Part I. Although this Note does not analyze the Food, Conservation, and En-
ergy Act of 2008 passed by Congress on June 18, 2008, a cursory review of the Act shows that 
many of its main provisions remain unchanged from the farm bill provisions in effect imme-
diately beforehand. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 
Stat. 1651; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, The 2008 Farm Bill Side-By-Side Comparison (Aug. 
20, 2008), http://www.ers.usda.gov/FarmBill/2008/2008FarmBillSideBySide121508.pdf. 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 See infra Part IV. 
12 See Econ. Research Serv., USDA, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 729, 
Provisions of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, at 1 
(Frederick J. Nelson & Lyle P. Schertz, eds., 1996), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
Publications/AIB729/aib729fm.pdf; Thomas Richard Poole, Note, Silly Rabbit, Farm Subsi-
dies Don’t Help America, 31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 183, 184 (2006). Congress 
has passed many major pieces of legislation between 1933 and 1996 relating to trade and 
agriculture. See Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra, at 128–38. 
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aid, and agricultural credit.13 Programs authorized in various farm bills 
generally last for set periods of time, but if no specific farm bill’s provi-
sions are in effect, agricultural policy reverts to the “permanent provi-
sions” of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and the Agriculture 
Act of 1949.14
 One important feature of all farm bill legislation since the 1930s 
has been the use of price supports—in the form of subsidies, price 
guarantees, and loans—that cover the production of certain agricul-
tural commodities.15 Legislators recognized that farmers faced many 
obstacles that affected crop production, such as unfavorable weather 
and fluctuations in demand.16 These factors often caused food short-
ages and jeopardized “national security, the family farm and [its] values 
. . . and America’s competitive position in the global market.”17 Provid-
ing domestic supports for the production of crops prevented these ca-
lamities and ensured a plentiful, inexpensive food supply.18
 As a consequence, farmers of certain commodities have continu-
ously enjoyed price supports in one form or another since the Great 
Depression.19 Commodity crops differ from other crops in that com-
modity crops serve both as food and as market-friendly agricultural 
products that are “easy to transport and virtually indestructible.”20 Out 
of over 400 crops grown in the United States, the vast majority of all 
subsidies go to just five commodity crops: rice, cotton, soybeans, wheat, 
and corn.21 Although the United States paid $164.7 billion in farm sub-
                                                                                                                      
13 Imhoff, supra note 1, at 22. 
14 Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 1, 128–29; Jason G. Buhi, Com-
ment, Serious Prejudice: The Decline and Fall of Agricultural Subsidies After the World Trade Or-
ganization’s Upland Cotton Decision, 24 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 237, 241 (2005); Poole, su-
pra note 12, at 189; see Dan Looker, Thinking the Unthinkable: Agriculture Under a 1949 Farm 
Bill, Agric. Online, Jan. 25, 2008, http://www.agriculture.com/ag/story.jhtml?sto 
ryid=/templatedata/ag/story/data/1201312975142.xml; Bill Scott, Farm Bureau Report, 
Voice of Idaho Ag News, Farm Bill Expiration Would Turn Ag on Its Ear, AgInfo.net, Feb. 4, 
2008, http://aginfo.net/index.cfm/event/report/id/10031. 
15 See Imhoff, supra note 1, at 25; Poole, supra note 12, at 183–84. 
16 Poole, supra note 12, at 186–87. 
17 Id. 
18 See Matthew MacLean, When Corn Is King, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 31, 2002, at 
17, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1031/p17s01-lihc.html. 
19 See Imhoff, supra note 1, at 34; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 128–
38 (summarizing the major legislation passed between 1933 and 1996 relating to trade and 
agriculture); Poole, supra note 12, at 184. 
20 See Pollan, supra note 1, at 26. 
21 Brian M. Riedl, Still at the Federal Trough: Farm Subsidies for the Rich and Famous Shat-
tered Records in 2001, Heritage Found., (April 30, 2002), available at http://www.heritage. 
org/research/agriculture/BG1542.cfm. 
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sidies from 1995 to 2005, over seventy percent—approximately $115.5 
billion—was spent on just those five crops.22 Domestic price supports 
for commodity crops figured prominently in two recent farm bills, the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 and 
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, and are also an 
important part of the most recently passed farm bill legislation.23
A. Loan-Based Systems: Agricultural Policy Before 1973—The “Ever-Normal 
Granary” and the Commodity Credit Corporation 
 Federal farm policy as it exists today began in the 1930s with the 
passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.24 Implemented as a 
“cornerstone” of the New Deal, the Act attempted to create a “[c]ent-
ralized food policy” in order to protect the twenty-five percent of 
Americans living on farms.25 These farmers faced extreme hardship 
during the Great Depression as crop prices dropped drastically due to 
overproduction.26 In order to stabilize the agricultural sector, the Act 
created the nation’s “first major price support and acreage reduction 
program,” focusing on achieving “parity” for farmers.27 The govern-
                                                                                                                      
 
22 Environmental Working Group, EWG Farm Subsidy Database, http://farm.ewg. 
org/farm/region.php?fips=00000 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
23 See The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 1101–
1210, 122 Stat. 1666–95 (2008); Imhoff, supra note 1, at 22; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, 
The 2002 Farm Bill: Provisions and Economic Implications (May 22, 2002), http://www. 
ers.usda.gov/publications/AP/AP022/AP022.pdf.; USDA, supra note 7. 
24 See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, §§ 1–46, 48 Stat. 31 
(1933); Imhoff, supra note 1, at 25. 
25 Imhoff, supra note 1, at 34. In getting a sense of what American farmers faced dur-
ing this period, Daniel Imhoff writes: 
During [the Great Depression], more than a third of the U.S. population was 
eking out a subsistence of grinding poverty. One in four Americans still lived 
on farms. Increasing numbers of tenant farmers and sharecroppers were 
forced from their land or pushed into desperate poverty. Farm foreclosures 
had become commonplace. 
Id. at 33. 
26 See id. at 33–34. During this period, “[t]otal farm income fell by two-thirds between 
1929 and 1932, . . . [s]ix of every ten farms had been mortgaged to survive, and . . . [in] 
the single year of 1932, five of every one hundred farms in Iowa were foreclosed and sold 
at auction.” Id. at 34. 
27 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 § 2; USDA, supra note 3, at iv. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture still calculates, but no longer uses, the parity index. Forrest Laws, Farm 
Programs May Revert to Permanent Law, Southeast Farm Press, Jan. 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.southeastfarmpress.com/legislation/farm-legislation-0108/index.html. Critics of 
the parity index disagree with its premise and see it as being of limited usefulness. Henry 
Hazlitt, Economics in One Lesson 92 (1949) (arguing that “[t]here is no sound reason 
for taking the particular price relationships that prevailed in a particular year or period and 
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ment defined parity as the “exchange relationship between agriculture 
and industry or between persons living on farms and persons not on 
farms” and calculated it by comparing the base price for a commodity 
with the price of goods and services used to produce the commodity— 
in effect, a measurement of farmers’ buying power.28 In aiming to 
achieve parity, the Roosevelt Administration hoped to bring stability to 
the agricultural sector and the economy as a whole by increasing farm-
ers’ income and encouraging spending, thus increasing demand in 
other sectors and ending the Depression.29 In the area of price sup-
ports, the Act sought to control the production of commodities in or-
der to prevent depressed prices.30 The Secretary of Agriculture offered 
direct payments to farmers who agreed to acreage restrictions.31 The 
Act also regulated the marketing of certain agricultural products and 
attempted to eliminate crop surpluses and expand markets.32
 To supplement these programs, in 1933 President Roosevelt estab-
lished by executive order the Commodity Credit Corporation (“CCC”), 
a Delaware corporation created “to stabilize, support, and protect farm 
income and prices” by offering emergency loans to farmers who might 
otherwise dump their crops on already flooded markets.33 The idea of 
balancing the grain supply—preventing famine during crop shortages 
with the excess from bountiful harvests—dated back to biblical times.34 
Used here, instead of directly preventing starvation by providing food 
to the hungry, the CCC prevented potentially disastrous variations in 
commodity prices by regulating available supplies.35 According to Virgil 
W. Dean, the CCC: 
attempted to raise farm prices on storable commodities by 
removing the surplus from the market when prices fell below 
                                                                                                                      
regarding them as sacrosanct”); Gregg Easterbrook, Making Sense of Agriculture, Atlantic 
Monthly, July, 1985, at 63, reprinted in  The Farm Crisis 7, 36 (The Reference Shelf 59:6, 
Robert Emmet Long ed., 1987) (finding that the parity index is “extremely misleading . . . 
because calculations of parity treat the present as if it were 1914 . . . [and] take into account 
the fact that tractors cost more but not that they do more”). 
28 USDA, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
29 Sally H. Clarke, Regulation and the Revolution in United States Farm Pro-
ductivity 154–55 (1994); Hazlitt, supra note 27, at 92. 
30 Clarke, supra note 29, at 143. 
31 USDA, supra note 3, at 4. 
32 Id. 
33 USDA, About the Commodity Credit Corp., http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp? 
area=about&subject=landing&topic=sao-cc (last visited Apr. 10, 2009); see Pollan, supra 
note 1, at 49. 
34 Imhoff, supra note 1, at 35; Pollan, supra note 1, at 49. 
35 See Pollan, supra note 1, at 49. 
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certain levels. Producers who chose to take advantage of this 
program could receive nonrecourse loans from the corpora-
tion to permit them to hold crops off the market at times of 
low prices. The loans used the commodities as collateral, giv-
ing the farmer a certain percentage of the current market 
value. If the borrower chose not to reclaim the crop, pre-
sumably because prices did not increase to a level to make this 
profitable, the government’s corporation was obligated to 
keep the stored commodity in full satisfaction of the loan.36
The Secretary of Agriculture set loan rates for each commodity at his 
discretion “in light of current supplies and anticipated demand.”37 The 
loans were mandatory for corn, wheat, and cotton, and could also be 
used for other commodities if needed.38 Neither Congress nor the Roo-
sevelt Administration envisioned the CCC to be a permanent entity—its 
original charter only ran for sixteen months from October 1933 to 
January 1935.39 The programs set out in the Act contributed to a fifty 
percent upswing in farm incomes in the two years between 1933 and 
1935.40 In 1936, the Supreme Court struck down certain provisions of 
the Act as unconstitutional, making way for the first of two permanent 
pieces of farm bill legislation.41
1. The First Piece of the “Permanent Provisions” Puzzle: The 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 
 The first “permanent” piece of agricultural legislation, the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938, built on domestic support programs 
originally established during the preceding five-year period.42 The Act, 
                                                                                                                      
36 Virgil W. Dean, An Opportunity Lost: The Truman Administration and the 
Farm Policy Debate 11 (2006); see Pollan, supra note 1, at 49. 
37 Dean, supra note 36, at 12. 
38 Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 128. Loans were made available for 
other commodities between 1933 and 1937, including rosin, turpentine, tobacco, peanuts, 
dates, figs, and prunes. Id. 
39 Clarke, supra note 29, at 154. 
40 USDA, supra note 3, at 10. 
41 U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68–69, 74 (1936). According to the Supreme Court, the 
Act unconstitutionally “invade[ed] the reserved rights of the states . . . [because it sought 
to] regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to 
the federal government.” Id. at 68. The Court observed that though there was no direct 
regulation, the Act created “coercion by economic pressure,” and that farmers were essen-
tially forced to comply with the provisions. Id. at 70–71, 74. 
42 See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, §§ 1–518, 52 Stat. 31 
(1938); USDA, supra note 3, at iv, 12; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 128. 
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“[a] comprehensive farm bill, . . . included provisions for production 
control, payments of benefits, mandatory loans, crop insurance, and 
soil conservation.”43 Among other things, Congress adopted new acre-
age allotments for certain commodities, limited payments for those 
abiding by allotments, and sought to achieve parity by making supple-
mental payments for those raising cotton, corn, rice, tobacco, and 
wheat.44 The legislation provided for the use of marketing controls in-
stead of direct production controls and created the “first comprehen-
sive price support legislation with nonrecourse loans.”45
 As part of its comprehensive price support program, the Act pro-
vided for the use of marketing quotas.46 Established by the Secretary of 
Agriculture for producers of corn, cotton, rice, tobacco, and wheat: 
Marketing quotas were used in conjunction with acreage al-
lotments as a more stringent means of controlling output. 
When the expected supply for a year exceeded estimated use 
by a specified amount, marketing quotas had to be pro-
claimed. . . . When marketing quotas were approved, compli-
ance with acreage allotments was compulsory; noncomplying 
producers not only lost price supports but were subject to 
penalties. If marketing quotas were disapproved, the level of 
price supports was lowered substantially for those who com-
plied with acreage allotments.47
Marketing quotas only came into effect if approved by two-thirds refer-
endum of the voting producers of the commodity in question.48
 In addition to marketing quotas, the 1938 Act extended the life of 
the CCC.49 Some posit that Congress saw the CCC as increasingly im-
portant in keeping the market stable.50 Originally envisioned as a tem-
porary means of enabling the Secretary of Agriculture to control com-
modity supplies during specific emergencies, Congress later mandated 
                                                                                                                      
43 J.W. Looney, The Changing Focus of Government Regulation of Agriculture in the United 
States, 44 Mercer L. Rev. 763, 765 (1993) (citations omitted); see Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938 §§ 1–518. 
44 USDA, supra note 3, at 13. It should be noted that implementing acreage allotments 
did not always result in lowered production levels. Id. at 15. 
45 Id. at iv, 13. 
46 Id. 
47 Willard W. Cochrane & Mary E. Ryan, American Farm Policy, 1948–1973, at xi 
(1976). 
48 Id. 
49 Clarke, supra note 29, at 159; see Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 § 302. 
50 See Clarke, supra note 29, at 159. 
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that nonrecourse loans become available for corn, wheat, and cotton 
when prices fell below certain parity levels.51 In doing this, Congress 
began to co-opt the Secretary of Agriculture’s role in setting rates for 
CCC loans even though the Act gave the Secretary the discretion to 
authorize subsidies and set loan rates for other commodities between 
1938 and 1940—including butter, figs, barley, wool, peanuts and to-
bacco.52
2. The Second Piece of the “Permanent Provisions” Puzzle: The 
Agricultural Act of 1949 
 The Agricultural Act of 1949 constitutes the other “major part of 
permanent agricultural legislation” that would take effect in conjunc-
tion with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.53 The 1949 Act built 
on the 1948 Act and reflected the view that high, fixed price supports 
would keep the agricultural sector most stable in the post-war years.54 
The Act provided for flexible price supports at high levels—generally 
around seventy to ninety percent of parity—for both basic and non-
basic commodities, with support levels mandatory for the former, and 
discretionary for the latter.55 The Act also expanded the list of com-
modities subject to mandatory support to include “wool and mohair, 
tung nuts, honey, Irish potatoes . . . milk, butterfat, and their prod-
ucts.”56
 The Act also adopted a new formula for calculating parity, modi-
fied from one initially introduced the previous year.57 The new formula 
added the ten-year period before the current year to the 1910–1914 
                                                                                                                      
51 See USDA, supra note 3, at 6, 14; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 
128. 
52 Dean, supra note 36, at 12; USDA, supra note 3, at 14; see Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938 § 302(a). In the following years, Congress not only mandated the provision of 
nonrecourse loans for certain commodities, but also set mandatory loan rates—a full 
eighty-five percent of parity in 1941, and extended those rates through the end of the war. 
Dean, supra note 36, at 12–13; USDA, supra note 3, at iv. 
53 Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 129; see Agricultural Act of 1949, 
Pub. L. No. 81-439, §§ 101–419, 63 Stat. 1051 (1949). 
54 USDA, supra note 3, at 17–18; see Agricultural Act of 1949 § 101. 
55 Dean, supra note 36, at 192–93; USDA, supra note 3, at 18–19; see Agricultural Act of 
1949 § 201. 
56 USDA, supra note 3, at 19; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 129; see 
Agricultural Act of 1949 §§ 101–302. 
57 See USDA, supra note 3, at 18–19. The Agriculture Act of 1948 modified the defini-
tion of parity as set out in previous farm bills and the 1949 Act further amended that for-
mula. Agricultural Act of 1949 § 409; Agriculture Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-897, § 201, 62 
Stat. 1247, 1250–51 (1948). 
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base period in making parity calculations.58 The 1949 revision also 
added two items to be taken into account when calculating the parity 
index: (1) labor costs for items purchased by farmers in calculations of 
their buying power; and (2) payments to commodity producers to 
commodity prices.59 The revised formula for calculating parity only 
took effect “where it would bring the producers of basic commodities 
higher prices,” but “generally meant higher parity prices.”60
B. Payment-Based Systems: Agricultural Policy After 1973—From Fencerow to 
Fencerow: A Key Transition 
 Although Congress enacted several major pieces of agricultural 
legislation between 1949 and 1971, the nature of price supports did not 
change dramatically until the passage of the Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection Act of 1973.61 Between 1972 and 1973, several factors— 
strong global demand for crops due to shortages abroad, a bad domes-
tic harvest, and the inflation of grocery prices—caused commodity 
prices to spike, drastically increasing the cost of food to the American 
consumer.62 In order to alleviate this problem, Earl Butz, the acting 
Secretary of Agriculture, “abolished the Ever-Normal Granary,” which 
was used to stabilize grain supplies.63 Secretary Butz opted to encour-
age the consolidation of farms in order to increase efficiency; he also 
made growing crops “from fencerow to fencerow” his top priority.64 
Where earlier programs sought to control production levels through 
acreage allotments and marketing quotas, the 1973 Act placed “empha-
sis on maintaining or increasing output.”65
                                                                                                                      
58 Agriculture Act of 1948 § 201; see USDA, supra note 3, at 18; Econ. Research Serv., 
USDA, supra note 12, at 129. The 1910–14 period was originally used in parity calculations 
because it was seen as an ideal period where agricultural prices remained stable and there 
was balance “between the purchasing power of city and country.” USDA, supra note 3, at 3. 
59 Agriculture Act of 1949 § 409; USDA, supra note 3, at 19. 
60 Dean, supra note 36, at 193; USDA, supra note 3, at 19. 
61 See Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, §§ 101–
1010, 87 Stat. 221 (1973); Pollan, supra note 1, at 52; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra 
note 12, at 128–29. Between 1949 and 1971, Congress passed eleven major pieces of legis-
lation having to do with agriculture, including the Agricultural Acts of 1954, 1956, 1964 
and 1970, and the Food and Agriculture Acts of 1962 and 1965. Econ. Research Serv., 
USDA, supra note 12, at 128–29. 
62 Pollan, supra note 1, at 51–52. At this time, “[t]he consumer price index for food 
(based on 1967=100) advanced from 114.9 in 1970 to 141.4 in 1973, outstripping most 
items in the overall CPI.” USDA, supra note 3, at 29. 
63 Pollan, supra note 1, at 52. 
64 Id. 
65 Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 pmbl.; USDA, supra note 3, at 29. 
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 One fundamental change resulted from this shift—the 1973 Act 
replaced parity-based price supports with target prices and deficiency 
payments.66 Under this system, the Act ended use of the parity index.67 
Instead, Congress set target prices; when market prices dropped below 
those targets, farmers received deficiency payments making up the dif-
ference.68 The most recent farm bills, including the Federal Agricul-
ture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, are variations of the pay-
ment-based arrangement first set out in the 1973 Act.69
1. A Payment-Based System Variant: The Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
 The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act’s 
major provisions, though payment-based, differ from the commodity 
subsidy system in its 1973 form.70 The FAIR Act provided predeter-
mined direct payments to farmers for certain crops through the use of 
production flexibility contracts (PFCs) and eliminated the previous 
twenty year old system of using target prices and price-sensitive defi-
ciency payments.71 Under the PFC program, Congress made a finite 
amount available for direct commodity payments each fiscal year; indi-
vidual farmers received payments calculated using a formula that took 
into account their “contract acreage.”72 PFC contracts were available to 
eligible farmers who grew certain commodities and signed up to par-
ticipate for the seven-year duration of the FAIR Act.73
 The amount set aside for PFC payments declined over the life of 
the FAIR Act because the Act “assumed that emerging export markets 
                                                                                                                      
66 USDA, supra note 3, at v, 29; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 129. 
67 USDA, supra note 3, at 29. 
68 Id. 
69 See Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 3. 
70 See id. at 1, 3. 
71 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 
§§ 101–928, 110 Stat. 888 (1996); Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at iv, 3. 
72 USDA, supra note 23. The set payment levels from 1996 to 2002 varied from ap-
proximately $4.0 to $5.8 billion. Id. In determining payments: 
The annual total amount was first determined for all contract crops com-
bined (wheat, rice, feed grains, and upland cotton) and then allocated to spe-
cific crops based on percentage allocation factors established in the 1996 Act. 
Each participating producer of a contract crop received payments equal to 
the product of their production flexibility contract payment quantity and the 
national average production flexibility contract payment rate. 
Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2002 Farm Bill: Glossary, http://www.nasda.org/ 
fb2007/NASDA%20FARM%20BILL%20MAR%202007/Tab%208%20-%202002glossary. pdf. 
73 USDA, supra note 23; see 2002 Farm Bill: Glossary, supra note 72. 
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would make traditional government price and income support unnec-
essary.”74 This proved to be a miscalculation, as markets failed to mate-
rialize.75 Beginning in 1998, Congress authorized the use of emergency 
market loss assistance (MLA) payments to supplement the PFC pay-
ments.76 The payments initially were used in 1998 to shore up low 
commodity prices—and were renewed in subsequent years—with over 
$18 billion paid out between 1998 and 2002 for commodity crops.77 
The MLA payments counteracted the effect of the gradual decrease in 
PFC payment levels, increasing the total amount paid in subsidies.78
 The FAIR Act also provided for continued commodity and market-
ing loans.79 These loans protected farmers from the need to sell their 
crops when prices were low by providing funds for “producers to store 
their harvested crop . . . and repay [the loan] upon the sale [of the 
crop] when market conditions [were] more favorable.”80 Marketing 
loans first came into effect with the Food Security Act of 1985 and al-
lowed repayment of loans at the lower of either the world market price 
or the loan rate (plus interest).81 Exercising this option meant that the 
producer effectively received additional income; when the world price 
was the lower of the two, the farmer ended up paying less than the loan 
rate, resulting in a “marketing loan gain.”82 The marketing loan pro-
gram started with rice and upland cotton, but eventually expanded.83 
In 1996, the FAIR Act “mandate[d] that marketing loan provisions be 
implemented for feed grains, wheat, rice, upland cotton, and all oil-
seeds.”84 Producers who chose not to exercise the lower repayment rate 
                                                                                                                      
74 Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007, 38 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 345, 
351 (2006); see USDA, supra note 23; see also Poole, supra note 12, at 191 (“[The FAIR Act] 
was to be the end of federal regulation of agriculture . . . . [but] prices fell unexpectedly 
near the end of the decade and Congress came to the rescue in the usual manner . . . mak-
ing the end of federal regulation of agriculture appear just like its beginning.”). 
75 See Morrow, supra note 74, at 351. 
76 See USDA, supra note 23. 
77 Environmental Working Group, supra note 22; USDA, supra note 23. 
78 See Morrow, supra note 74, at 351; Environmental Working Group, EWG Farm Sub-
sidy Database, http://farm.ewg.org/farm/regiondetail.php?fips=00000 (last visited Apr. 
10, 2009). 
79 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 
§§ 131–137, 110 Stat. 888, 905–13 (1996); Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 9. 
80 Buhi, supra note 14, at 241. 
81 Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 7.207, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 
8, 2004) [hereinafter Cotton Panel Report]; 2002 Farm Bill: Glossary, supra note 72. 
82 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶ 7.207; Buhi, supra note 14, at 241, 246. 
83 2002 Farm Bill: Glossary, supra note 72. 
84 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 §§ 131–137; 2002 Farm 
Bill: Glossary, supra note 72. 
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option could instead elect to receive “loan deficiency payment[s]” 
(LDPs) that compensated them for those amounts.85
2. A Substantially Similar Payment-Based System: The Farm Security 
and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
 Although the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
made some modifications to the FAIR Act’s existing programs, most 
provisions of the FAIR Act had similar counterparts in the 2002 Act.86 
The 2002 Act used three main programs to support commodity-crop 
farmers: (1) direct payments; (2) counter-cyclical payments; and (3) 
marketing loans.87
 Under the 2002 Act, the method for calculating direct payments 
differed from the system used for determining PFC payments.88 PFC 
payments are calculated based on a government-preset payment amount 
and paying each farmer individually according to the amount grown 
using that rate.89 In contrast, the 2002 Act paid farmers directly for cer-
tain commodity crops—wheat, corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats, upland 
cotton, rice, and soybeans and other oilseeds—as they did in the origi-
nal 1973 system.90 Under this system, payments were not made accord-
ing to predetermined levels of government spending.91
 In addition, a new program of counter-cyclical payments replaced 
the supplemental MLA payments of the FAIR Act.92 In contrast to the 
emergency nature of the MLA payments, which required annual re-
newal, Congress wrote counter-cyclical payments directly into the 2002 
Act.93 The 2002 Act provided that payments would be made when the 
“effective” price of commodities did not meet a target price that was set 
                                                                                                                      
85 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 § 135; see Cotton Panel 
Report, supra note 81, ¶ 7.207. 
86 See USDA, supra note 23 (providing side-by-side comparison between commodity 
programs proposed for the 2002 Act, and their counterparts in the FAIR Act). 
87 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, §§ 1001–
10910, 116 Stat. 134 (2002); Morrow, supra note 74, at 352; USDA, supra note 23. 
88 See USDA, supra note 23. 
89 See id. 
90 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 § 1103; see USDA, supra note 23. 
91 See USDA, supra note 23. The payment rates for the different crops included $0.24 
per bushel of barley, to $0.52 per bushel of wheat, and the payment rate for upland cotton 
was $0.667 per pound. Id. 
92 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 § 1104; e.g., Agricultural Risk Pro-
tection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-224, § 201, 114 Stat. 358, 398 (2000); see Morrow, supra 
note 74, at 353; USDA, supra note 23. 
93 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 § 1104; e.g., Agricultural Risk Pro-
tection Act of 2000 § 201; see Morrow, supra note 74, at 353. 
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in legislation and “based on a historical average of payment yields from 
1998 through 2001.”94 The new system of direct and counter-cyclical 
payments helped farmers because it ended the practice of basing pay-
ments on the acreage used in planting commodity crops.95 Marketing 
assistance loans and loan deficiency payments continued much as they 
had before but with minor modifications.96 For example, the 2002 Act 
expanded both programs to include “peanuts, wool, mohair, honey, 
small chickpeas, lentils, and dry peas.”97
 In addition to subsidy payments for growing crops, the FAIR and 
2002 Acts contained provisions for export guarantee programs and 
programs specific to cotton producers.98 Export guarantee programs— 
originally established under the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978— func-
tioned to “guarantee repayment of credit extended to eligible banks 
which issue[d] letters of credit on behalf of purchasers of U.S. prod-
ucts.”99 Credit extended under the Export Credit Guarantee Program, 
also known as the General Sales Manager-102, or GSM-102, was good 
for up to three years.100 FAIR Act’s Intermediate Export Credit Guaran-
tee Program created the GSM-103 credit, which was good for up to ten 
years.101 Another program, the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program, 
also guaranteed payments from foreign purchasers of agricultural 
commodities produced in the United States.102 The Acts also continued 
a series of payments specifically available to cotton producers—“user 
marketing (Step 2) payments.”103 Under certain circumstances, when 
“United States cotton pricing benchmarks [were] exceeded,” eligible 
                                                                                                                      
94 Shumaker, supra note 4, at 554; USDA, supra note 23. “The effective price is equal to 
the sum of 1) the higher of the national average farm price for the marketing year, or the 
national loan rate for the commodity and 2) the direct payment rate for the commodity.” 
USDA, supra note 23. 
95 Shumaker, supra note 4, at 554. 
96 USDA, supra note 23. 
97 USDA, supra note 23 see Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 §§ 1201–
1202, 1205. 
98 See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 §§ 1207–1208, 3102; Federal Ag-
riculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, §§ 136, 243, 110 Stat. 
888, 909–10, 965–967 (1996); USDA, supra note 23. 
99 Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 37, 38; see Agricultural Trade Act of 
1978 §§ 101–604. 
100 Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 38; see Farm Security and Rural In-
vestment Act of 2002 § 3102; Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
§ 243; Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 §§ 101–604. 
101 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶¶ 7.242–.243; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, 
supra note 12, at 38. 
102 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶ 7.244. 
103 See id. ¶ 7.209; USDA, supra note 23. 
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exporters and users of domestic upland cotton were given either mar-
keting certificates, or cash payments.104 These “pricing benchmarks” 
were tied to the world price of cotton and to price quotations in north-
ern Europe and the United States.105
II. A Fundamental Shift: The Difference Between Domestic 
Price Support Systems Before and After 1973—The  
Global and Domestic Effects of Direct Payments 
 The payment-based systems derived from the Agriculture and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1973—later outlined in the FAIR and 2002 
Acts—are relatively new in the history of farm bill legislation, but have 
had tremendous ramifications on crop production.106 Payment-based 
subsidies encouraged overproduction, both for corn and other subsi-
dized crops, without an eye to either demand or price.107 According to 
Michael Pollan’s discussion of industrial corn in The Omnivore’s Dilemma: 
 The change from loans to direct payments hardly seems 
momentous—either way, the government pledges to make 
sure the farmer receives some target price for a bushel of corn 
when prices are weak. But in fact paying farmers directly for 
the shortfall in the price of corn was revolutionary. . . . They 
had removed the floor under the price of grain. Instead of 
keeping corn out [when prices were low,] the new subsidies 
encouraged farmers to sell their corn at any price, since the 
government would make up the difference.108
Payment-based subsidies, which were meant to increase productivity, 
replaced measures such as price support through loans, “land idling,” 
and government purchase of surplus grain.109 The nature of the agricul-
tural sector exacerbated problems with overproduction due to factors 
such as the inelastic demand for food, the tendency towards overpro-
duction due to new technologies, and difficulty in shifting “resources 
previously committed to farm production . . . out of farming” commod-
                                                                                                                      
104 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶ 7.209. 
105 Id.; Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 11. 
106 See Pollan, supra note 1, at 52–53. 
107 See id. at 52–54; Alexei Barrionuevo, Mountains of Corn and a Sea of Farm Subsidies, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2005, at A1; Tom Philpott, Food First: Institute for Food and Develop-
ment Policy, The 2007 Farm—and Food—Bill, Backgrounder, Fall 2006, at 1, 3, available at 
http://www.foodfirst.org/files/pdf/backgrounders/fall2006.pdf. 
108 Pollan, supra note 1, at 52. 
109 See id. 
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ity crops.110 As a result, price supports traditionally used to help family 
farmers in times of crisis were used to make commodity crops cheaper 
domestically and more competitive in the world markets by encouraging 
overproduction and artificially depressing prices, while paying to keep 
farmers in business.111
 Payment-based subsidies for commodity crops, outlined in recent 
farm bills, have drawn heavy fire from critics who blame the system for 
rising obesity rates, ongoing environmental impacts caused by intensive 
farming, and the perpetuation of poverty in developing countries.112 
The set price that the government is willing to pay for commodity crops 
guarantees their sale and discourages farmers from growing other, un-
subsidized crops.113 The effects of this shift can be seen worldwide; for 
example, critics accuse American corn subsidies of “pushing the poor-
est Mexican corn farmers out of business.”114
 Because most farm bill programs only last for finite periods of 
time, proposals for new farm bills offer chances to rectify such prob-
lems.115 The provisions of the 2002 Act provided for its lapse in 2007.116 
Though this presented an opportunity to overhaul current agricultural 
policies, Congress ultimately passed the five-year Food, Conservation, 
                                                                                                                      
110 Cochrane & Ryan, supra note 47, at 15; see Pollan, supra note 1, at 54. 
111 See Imhoff, supra note 1, at 72, 74; Pollan, supra note 1, at 52, 54; Philpott, supra 
note 107, at 1. This is not the first time that government and commodities producers have 
“found” new markets to increase demand and boost crop prices in the face of overproduc-
tion; the school lunch program, the feeding of grain to cattle, the advent of high-fructose 
corn syrup, and the development of corn ethanol as a gasoline additive (and now as an 
alternative fuel) can all be traced back to the desire to dispose of commodity surpluses. See 
Cochrane & Ryan, supra note 47, at 73; MacLean, supra note 18; Pollan, supra note 1, at 
67, 103. 
112 See Pollan, supra note 1, at 54, 102–03; Philpott, supra note 107, at 2. The availabil-
ity of cheap commodity crops translates into cheap food for consumers, and not just for 
processed foods containing commodity ingredients such as high-fructose corn syrup. See 
Pollan, supra note 1, at 18–19. Cheap meat, poultry, and dairy products also depend on 
inexpensive feed supplies, which come from commodity crops. See id. at 18. 
113 Pollan, supra note 1, at 54. 
114 Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Corn Subsidies Said to Damage Mexico, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 
2003, at C4; see Poole, supra note 12, at 192–93. The United States has also been accused of 
“subsidiz[ing] domestic farmers to the point of having to pay to feed foreign farmers, who 
without the subsidies would have been able to feed themselves.” Poole, supra note 12, at 
193. 
115 See Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 1; Morrow, supra note 74, at 
346. 
116 See Larry Matlack, Editorial, Parity May Be a Dream, but Current Farm Programs Are a 
Nightmare, High Plains/Midwest Ag J., Oct. 29, 2007, available at http://www.hpj.com/ 
archives/2007/oct07/oct29/Paritymaybeadreambutcurrent.cfm. 
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and Energy Act of 2008 on June 18, 2008, which kept many of the pro-
visions of the 2002 Act unchanged.117
III. The United States, Farm Subsidies, and the World Trade 
Organization 
 The issue of subsidies has become increasingly important on the 
international stage because trade is vital to globalization, and may make 
up a large part of a country’s economy.118 According to the theory of 
comparative advantage, countries benefit the most when they are al-
lowed to trade with each other without governmental interference.119 
In order to facilitate trade amongst countries, a group of nations 
formed the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 in order to es-
tablish rules for international commerce, resolve trade disputes 
amongst member nations, and provide a forum for members to negoti-
ate trade issues.120 The United States has been a member of the WTO 
since January 1, 1995, when the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization became effective.121
A. The WTO Dispute Resolution Process: An Overview 
 The WTO dispute settlement process functions as “the central pil-
lar of the multilateral trading system.”122 Members can seek to resolve 
disputes by bringing complaints against other members who they feel 
                                                                                                                      
117 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 1001–15422, 
122 Stat. 1651 (2008); USDA, supra note 7. 
118 See Chris Wold et al., Trade and the Environment: Law and Policy 1, 9 
(2005). For example, exports made up approximately fifteen percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) in the United States, and half of the GDP in Canada. Id. at 3. 
119 Id. at 26–27. 
120 WTO, Understanding the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/tif_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). The WTO was formed in accordance with the 
rules set out in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which first took 
effect in 1948. Id. See generally Wold et al., supra note 118, at 72–76 (providing back-
ground information on the history and development of GATT). 
121 See Wold et al., supra note 118, at 77; WTO, supra note 120; WTO, Understanding 
the WTO—Members, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
122 WTO, Understanding the WTO—A Unique Contribution, http://www.wto.org/eng 
lish/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Under-
standing the WTO—A Unique Contribution]; see Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
588 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:571 
are not abiding by the agreed-upon trade rules.123 Cases begin with re-
quests for formal consultations that may last up to sixty days.124 If the 
disagreement cannot be resolved through consultations or formal me-
diation during this time, a three-member panel is convened.125 This 
panel is given six months to consider the arguments presented and is-
sue a written report.126 The WTO adopts the report unless it is ap-
pealed or rejected by a consensus of all WTO members.127 Either party 
may appeal the decision before the Appellate Body, which “can affirm, 
reverse, or modify the report of the panel.”128 The Appellate Body also 
issues a report, and unless rejected by all WTO members, the decision 
is adopted.129 Upon the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report, 
the losing country is expected to comply with the terms of the report, 
either immediately or within a reasonable time as a general obligation 
under international law.130 If the losing party refuses to comply, unilat-
eral trade sanctions may be authorized by the Dispute Settlement Body 
(the “DSB”), with any outstanding matters remaining within the pur-
view of the DSB.131
B. Regulation of Agriculture in the WTO 
 The issue of agricultural subsidies is a hotly contested topic in the 
WTO.132 According to Michael Shumaker, the reason for this is simply 
that: 
                                                                                                                      
123 See Understanding the WTO—A Unique Contribution, supra note 122. See generally 
Wold et al., supra note 118, at 95–102 (providing a more detailed overview of the WTO 
dispute resolution process); Shumaker, supra note 4, 567–77 (providing a general overview 
of the background of WTO dispute resolution, and of the procedure in place for settle-
ment of disputes between WTO members). 
124 Understanding the WTO—A Unique Contribution, supra note 122; see WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding, supra note 122, art. 3.7. 
125 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 122, art. 3.7, 8.5; Understand-
ing the WTO—A Unique Contribution, supra note 122. Under some circumstances, such 
panel may consist of five members. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 
122, art. 8.5. 
126 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 122, art. 12.8; Understanding 
the WTO—A Unique Contribution, supra note 122. 
127 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 122, art. 16.4; Understanding 
the WTO—A Unique Contribution, supra note 122. 
128 Wold et al., supra note 118, at 96–97; see Understanding the WTO—A Unique 
Contribution, supra note 122. 
129 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 122, art. 17.14; Understanding 
the WTO—A Unique Contribution, supra note 122. 
130 Wold et al., supra note 118, at 97. 
131 See Understanding the WTO—A Unique Contribution, supra note 122. 
132 See Wold et al., supra note 118, at 599–600. 
2009] Fixing the Farm Bill to Achieve WTO Compliance 589 
Agriculture is a sensitive topic in virtually every country. In 
general, agricultural products are easily exported . . . [y]et, 
every country seeks to maximize economic advantages for its 
own agricultural sector. . . . [D]eveloping countries have few 
opportunities other than agriculture for trade and develop-
ment while developed countries seek to defend their rapidly 
diminishing competitive advantage in agricultural produc-
tion.133
All countries use domestic price supports in regulating agriculture.134 
Developed countries often can afford to sink more money into these 
endeavors than their less-developed counterparts.135 For this reason, 
disputes have arisen amongst countries in the fight for market share.136 
For example, disagreements between developed and developing na-
tions regarding agricultural trade stalled talks on the Doha agenda 
among the WTO’s member nations in September 2003, and seven years 
after they began, the talks have proven ineffective.137
 In the WTO, subsidies are generally governed by the terms of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the “SCM 
Agreement”).138 In drafting the SCM Agreement, the WTO took into 
                                                                                                                      
133 Shumaker, supra note 4, at 549 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
134 Wold et al., supra note 118, at 598. 
135 See Inst. for Agric. and Trade Policy, WTO Cancun Series Paper No. 2: World 
Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture Basics 6 (2003), available at http://www. 
iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?accountID=451&refID=25939; Wold et al., supra note 118, 
at 598. 
136 See Wold et al., supra note 118, at 599. 
137 Id; Editorial, The Next Step for World Trade, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2008, at A14. The WTO 
provides for a Ministerial Conference, consisting of all members, that is to “make all major 
policy decisions, initiate new negotiations, and otherwise determine the strategic direction of 
the WTO.” Wold et al., supra note 118, at 78, 80. These conferences take place once every 
two years in different cities—Singapore in 1996, Geneva in 1998, Seattle in 1999, Doha in 
2001, Cancun in 2003, and Hong Kong in 2005. Id.; WTO, Ministerial Conferences—
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ 
min_declaration_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). Members put issues to be addressed on an 
agenda and conduct talks attempting to come to consensus on how to approach those issues. 
Wold et al., supra note 118, at 80. The Doha Ministerial Conference took place in Novem-
ber 2001, and addressed issues such as trade in services and trade in intellectual property 
rights, in addition to the question of agricultural subsidies. See World Trade Organization, 
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November, 2001, ¶¶ 13–15, 17–19, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 
I.L.M. 746 (2002). During talks in 2003 meant to further the goals set out during the Doha 
Ministerial Conference, Japan, the European Union, the United States, and Canada—leaders 
in world in agricultural subsidies—refused a request from China, India, Brazil, and other 
developing countries to decrease those subsidies. Wold et al., supra note 118, at 599. 
138 See WTO, Legal Texts—The WTO Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
590 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:571 
account the fact that agriculture remained one of the most heavily sub-
sidized sectors in many national economies, and created special provi-
sions for handling this area.139 As a result, the SCM Agreement defers 
to the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (the “Agriculture Agree-
ment”) on the issue of prohibited subsidies.140
 The WTO classifies all agricultural subsidies in one of three 
“boxes,” based on their effects on trade flows.141 “Green box” subsidies 
must be funded by the government and cause little to no trade distor-
tion.142 Subsidies in this category include payments towards research, 
pest control, regional development and environmental protection, as 
well as “direct income supports for farmers that are not related to (are 
‘decoupled’ from) current production levels or prices.”143
 In contrast, “amber box” subsidies exhibit trade- and production-
distorting effects and include supports tied to production and market 
price.144 Most agricultural supports are presumed to be of this type.145 
Minimal supports of this type—totaling between five and ten percent of 
production—may be used; the Agriculture Agreement required subsidy 
reductions from the thirty countries who exceeded these “de minimis” 
levels.146 Countries calculated reduction amounts by using a measure 
that took into account all supports (both specifically allocated and oth-
erwise) before coming up with an allowed Total Aggregate Measure-
ment of Support (Total AMS).147
                                                                                                                      
139 See Stephen J. Powell & Andrew Schmitz, The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture, 10 Drake J. Agric. L. 
287, 290 (2005). 
140 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 3.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instru-
ments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agree-
ment]; Powell & Schmitz, supra note 139, at 290. 
141 See WTO, Domestic Support in Agriculture: The Boxes (Oct. 1, 2002), available at 
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142 Id. 
143 Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uru-
guay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Agriculture Agreement]; WTO, supra note 
141. 
144 WTO, supra note 141; see Agriculture Agreement, supra note 143, arts. 6.1, 6.3. 
145 Inst. for Agric. and Trade Policy, supra note 135, at 5. The United States and 
European Union currently lead the world in spending on domestic supports for agricul-
ture. Id. 
146 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 143, art. 6.4; WTO, supra note 141. Supports up 
to “de minimis” levels are not calculated into a country’s AMS levels. Inst. for Agric. and 
Trade Policy, supra note 135, at 5. 
147 WTO, supra note 141; see Agriculture Agreement, supra note 143, arts. 6.1, 6.3. 
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 A third type of agricultural subsidy— “blue box” supports—are sup-
ports that would normally fall under the “amber box” category, but are 
classified differently due to certain restrictions that decrease their im-
pact on the market.148 These restrictions might limit production by bas-
ing the payments on fixed area and yields, or by basing them on “85 
percent or less of the base level of production,” thus allowing producers 
to avoid mandatory domestic payment reductions.149 Article 13 of the 
Agriculture Agreement exempted permitted subsidies from action un-
der the SCM Agreement for nine years after the adoption of the WTO 
Agreement in 1995, after which countries could challenge supports that 
otherwise met limits set in the Agriculture Agreement.150 Although 
there are prohibited “red box” subsidies described in the SCM Agree-
ment, those do not exist in the context of the Agriculture Agreement.151
1. An Unprecedented Decision for U.S. Farm Policy: United States—
Upland Cotton 
 One of the first actions brought in the WTO for violation of the 
provisions of the Agriculture Agreement and the SCM Agreement had 
significant implications for United States agricultural policy.152 Brazil 
formally requested consultation with the United States on the issue of 
its upland cotton subsidies on September 27, 2002.153 From 1999 to 
2002, the United States produced about one fifth of the world’s cotton, 
second only to China.154 At this time, the United States was also the 
world’s leading exporter.155 Brazil’s share of the global upland cotton 
market and domestic production numbers were infinitesimal in com-
parison—less than three and five percent, respectively.156 The parties 
failed to resolve their differences, and on February 6, 2003, Brazil re-
                                                                                                                      
148 See Agriculture Agreement, supra note 143, art. 6.5; WTO, supra note 141. 
149 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 143, art. 6.5. There is a third provision here that 
exempts from reduction payments based on a fixed number of livestock. Id. art. 6.5(a)(iii). 
150 Id. art. 1(f), 13; Inst. for Agric. and Trade Policy, supra note 135, at 7. 
151 WTO, supra note 141. 
152 Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/1 
(Oct. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Brazil Consultation Request]. 
153 Id. Native to Mexico and Central America, upland cotton, or Gossypium hirsutum, 
makes up ninety-five percent of all cotton cultivated commercially in the United States. Cot-
ton, Inc., The Classification of Cotton, http://www.cottoninc.com/ClassificationofCotton/ 
?Pg=2#Nature (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
154 See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶¶ 7.1281–82; International Cotton Advi-
sory Committee, Cotton: World Statistics, at 4 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.icac.org/ 
cotton_info/publications/samples/stats_ws/cott_stats_sept_02.pdf. 
155 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶ 7.1283. 
156 Id. ¶ 7.1284. 
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quested the establishment of a panel to assess the facts presented and 
make recommendations or issue a ruling.157
 Both the consultation request and the panel request raised the 
same issues.158 In its submissions to the DSB, Brazil claimed that certain 
subsidies provided to growers, exporters, and users of upland cotton 
were prohibited by the WTO.159 Among other things, Brazil challenged 
the use of domestic supports under the FAIR Act and the 2002 Act, in-
cluding: direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, crop insurance, 
marketing loans, and loan deficiency payments; export subsidies pro-
vided under the FAIR and 2002 Acts; subsidies contingent on use of 
domestic instead of foreign cotton; and the use of Step 2 marketing 
certificates and payments.160
 The panel circulated its decision on September 8, 2004, six months 
after its projected completion date and almost eighteen months after 
the panel was first requested.161 In its decision, the Panel found that 
challenged export subsidies on upland cotton and other subsidized 
crops violated articles 8 and 10.1 of the Agriculture Agreement by un-
dertaking export subsidies that “result[ed] in circumvention of United 
States’ export subsidy commitments.”162 Export subsidies violated arti-
cles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement because the subsidies in ques-
tion were contingent on export performance.163 The Panel also found 
that Step 2 payments to domestic users and exporters of cotton violated 
articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.164 In light of these findings, 
                                                                                                                      
 
157 Request for Establishment of a Panel by Brazil, United States—Subsidies on Upland 
Cotton, WT/DS267/7 (Feb. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Brazil Panel Request]; see WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, supra note 122, art. 11. 
158 See Brazil Panel Request, supra note 157; Brazil Consultation Request, supra note 
152. 
159 Brazil Panel Request, supra note 157; Brazil Consultation Request, supra note 152. 
160 Brazil Panel Request, supra note 157; Brazil Consultation Request, supra note 152. 
161 WTO, Dispute Settlements – The Disputes – DS267, Summary of the Dispute to Date, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 
2009). 
162 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶¶ 7.875, 8.1(d)(i); see Agriculture Agreement, 
supra note 143, arts. 8, 10.1. Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement specifies that “[e]ach 
Member undertakes not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this 
Agreement and with the commitments as specified in that Member’s Schedule,” and arti-
cle 10.1 specifies that certain export subsidies are not to be “applied in a manner which 
results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments.” 
Agriculture Agreement, supra note 143, arts. 8, 10.1. 
163 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81 ¶¶ 7.947, 8.1(d)(i). Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of 
the SCM Agreement prohibit the grant or maintenance of “subsidies contingent . . . upon 
export performance.” SCM Agreement, supra note 140, arts. 3.1(a), 3.2. 
164 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶ 8.1(e)(iii)–(f). Step 2 payments to domestic us-
ers of upland cotton were invalid because they “were subsidies contingent on the use of do-
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the panel recommended the immediate withdrawal of subsidies prohib-
ited under the SCM Agreement.165
 In addition, the panel also found that certain price-contingent 
subsidies suppressed prices, caused serious prejudice to Brazil’s inter-
ests pursuant to article 6.3(c) of the Agriculture Agreement, and should 
be removed.166 The panel considered three factors in its determination 
of whether there was significant suppression: “(1) the relative magni-
tude of U.S. production and exports in the world cotton market; (2) 
general price trends in the market for the subsidized product; and (3) 
the nature of the challenged subsidies.”167 The panel held that the sub-
sidies in question were price-contingent and therefore actionable be-
cause they functioned to “insulate U.S. production from the effects of 
the global market.”168 The price-contingent subsidies identified as caus-
ing price suppression included marketing loans, Step 2 payments, mar-
ket loss assistance payments, and counter-cyclical payments.169 The 
panel pointed out that for these subsidies, “the United States [was] un-
der an obligation to ‘take appropriate steps to remove the adverse ef-
fects or . . . withdraw the subsid[ies].’”170 The panel’s ruling did not, 
however, include subsidies deemed to be non-price-contingent, such as 
PFC payments, direct payments, and crop insurance payments.171 The 
United States appealed the results of the panel report, and the Appel-
late Body re-examined the issues addressed.172 The Appellate Body re-
                                                                                                                      
mestic over imported goods,” and Step 2 payments to exporters were also prohibited. Id. 
¶ 8.1(f); WTO, United States—Upland Cotton (DS267) Summary of the Key Findings 
of this Dispute 99 (2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds267sum_e.pdf [hereinafter United States—Upland Cotton Factsheet]. 
165 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶ 8.3(b)–(c); United States—Upland Cotton Fact-
sheet, supra note 164. 
166 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶¶ 8.1(g)(i), 8.3(d); United States—Upland Cot-
ton Factsheet, supra note 164; see Buhi, supra note 14, at 246–47. 
167 Buhi, supra note 14, at 245. In relation to the first two factors, findings showed that 
a decrease in the world market price of cotton corresponded with an increase in the 
American market share of cotton exports, hinting at the existence of artificial price sup-
pression, though ultimately holding that such indications were “inconclusive.” Id. at 245–
46. 
168 Id. at 246. 
169 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶ 8.1(g)(i); Buhi, supra note 14, at 246. 
170 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 81, ¶ 8.3(d). 
171 Id. ¶ 8.1(g)(ii); Buhi, supra note 14, at 246. 
172 See WTO, supra note 161. 
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leased their final report on March 3, 2005 (the “Upland Cotton deci-
sion”), which largely upheld the panel’s findings.173
2. United States—Upland Cotton: Implications for U.S. Farm Policy 
 The Upland Cotton decision caused ramifications beyond the im-
mediate panel and Appellate Body rulings.174 The United States subsi-
dizes and holds considerable market share in many crops other than 
upland cotton.175 Some observers concluded that future WTO chal-
lenges to other United States crop subsidies were likely to follow.176 
They were right—less than two years after the Appellate Body ruling, 
Canada requested consultations on the issue of United States agricul-
tural subsidies for corn and other crops.177 Canada’s complaint ulti-
mately challenged use of export subsidies in the United States and 
claimed that the amount of its “amber box” domestic supports ex-
ceeded allowed AMS levels under the Agriculture Agreement.178 The 
outcome of that dispute, since joined by Brazil and currently in front of 
a WTO dispute resolution panel, is still pending.179
 Congress recognized, at least on a cursory level, the importance of 
complying with WTO restrictions on subsidies.180 In response to the 
Upland Cotton decision, the Department of Agriculture discontinued 
the Step 2 program of payments and marketing certificates for cotton 
in August 2006.181 In its 2007 farm bill proposals, the USDA noted the 
WTO’s conclusion that supports such as marketing assistance loans, 
gains on marketing loans, and counter-cyclical payments constituted 
                                                                                                                      
173 Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶¶ 763–64 
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174 See Request for Consultations by Canada, United States—Subsidies and Other Domestic 
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176 See Buhi, supra note 14, at 252. 
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179 See WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS357, http://www.wto.org/english/tra 
top_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds357_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
180 See USDA, supra note 5, at 38–39. 
181 Id. at 10. 
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trade-distorting “amber box” subsidies.182 To ensure compliance with 
WTO regulations, the proposal recommended that the 2007 farm bill 
contain a “circuit breaker” provision, similar to one originally drafted 
into the 2002 farm bill.183 Applying such a provision to certain “com-
modity programs,” would theoretically prevent overspending on agri-
cultural subsidies.184 More recently, trade representatives have indi-
cated that Washington may be willing to cut subsidies available to 
farmers below levels currently permitted.185
IV. Moving Forward by Moving Backwards? Returning to a  
Pre-1973 Price Support System 
 Understanding how pre-1973 American farm legislation works 
both domestically and on a global scale is not a purely theoretical exer-
cise—it involves practical legal and policy implications. Upon expira-
tion of current farm bill legislation, absent an extension or new legisla-
tion, the “permanent provisions” of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938 and the Agriculture Act of 1949 govern domestic supports in 
American agriculture.186 For example, the newly passed Food, Conser-
vation, and Energy Act of 2008 is set to expire in five years.187 It is there-
fore important to consider whether returning to a pre-1973 price sup-
port system makes sense from a policy standpoint, and whether it is 
actually legal by WTO standards, since revising farm bill legislation is an 
                                                                                                                      
182 Id. at 9–10. The WTO Agriculture Agreement limits the United States to $19.1 bil-
lion annually in “amber box” subsidies. Id. at 39. 
183 See id. at 38–39. The provision in the 2002 Act stated that: 
If the Secretary determines that expenditures . . . that are subject to the total 
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Id. at 38 (quoting Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171 
§ 1601(e), 116 stat. 134, 212 (2002)). In recognition of the fact that future WTO agree-
ments might supersede the Uruguay Round Agreements, the 2007 farm bill proposal con-
tains language referring to “the Uruguay Round Agreements, or any successor agree-
ments.” Id. at 38–39. 
184 See id. at 39. 
185 Farm Bill Is Approved, N.Y. Times, June 19, 2008, at A24; U.S. Offers a Subsidy Conces-
sion at Trade Talks, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2008. 
186 Econ. Research Serv., USDA, supra note 12, at 1, 128–29. 
187 Food. Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, pmbl., 112 Stat. 
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issue that arises once every several years.188 Reverting to the permanent 
provisions may provide a viable solution to problems plaguing Ameri-
can farm policy.189
 Upon careful examination of the permanent provisions, it appears 
that using a pre-1973 system may offer a solution on how to simultane-
ously alleviate domestic overproduction problems and WTO trade rule 
violations, but only if the United States is willing to release its hold on 
commodity export markets.190 Even if the permanent provisions are 
not adopted in their entirety, examining features of the pre-1973 sys-
tems may offer valuable lessons on how to shape future farm bill legisla-
tion to address issues of overproduction and WTO compliance.191
 To date, Congress has insisted on alleviating current farm bill prob-
lems by adjusting the post-1973 payment-based system rather than con-
sidering a loan-based system like that outlined in the permanent provi-
sions.192 For example, in the Upland Cotton decision, the WTO panel 
determined that certain direct payments were production-related, and 
therefore did not constitute allowed “green box” subsidies under the 
Agriculture Agreement.193 Because direct payments were “conditioned 
on the recipients’ avoiding production of certain crops after the base 
period, [they were therefore] . . . related to current production and 
[did] not meet the criteria for decoupled income support.”194 Instead of 
considering non-payment-based methods of supporting farmers, USDA 
proposed a payment-based solution that removed restrictions on the 
planting of fruits, vegetables, and wild rice so that payments would no 
longer be considered production-related, trade-distorting subsidies sub-
ject to limits.195 In the Upland Cotton decision, the WTO also held that 
the USDA’s program of marketing assistance loans—including market-
ing loans and counter-cyclical payments—should be figured into AMS 
calculations because they distorted trade and “contributed to price sup-
pression in world cotton markets.”196 Although technically a “loan” pro-
gram, the WTO panel determined that producers often profited from 
                                                                                                                      
188 See Looker, supra note 14. 
189 Some groups, including the National Farmers Union, are willing to work with the 
possibility of reverting to the permanent provisions. Looker, supra note 14. 
190 See Shumaker, supra note 4, at 549. 
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the loans through marketing loan gains and noted that producers could 
also elect to receive actual deficiency payments.197 Congress responded 
to this finding in the the 2007 farm bill proposal by suggesting “a more 
market-based solution for determining loan rates,” but there was no se-
rious move away from using heavily payment-based supports.198 Con-
gress’s failure to seriously consider loan-based alternatives to payment-
based price supports may seriously impede its efforts to solve problems 
with American farm policy.199
 Failing to consider the predominantly loan-based systems used be-
fore 1973 is shortsighted on two levels. First, the adoption of a loan-
based system may solve problems of overproduction and WTO compli-
ance currently plaguing domestic agricultural policy. Even if not 
adopted as a whole, studying the system may offer valuable insights for 
those drafting future farm bill legislation.200 Looking at the permanent 
provisions in United States agricultural legislation may offer remedies 
to those seeking to address problems associated with post-1973 farm 
bills because loan-based systems affect the market differently from 
payment-based systems.201 Second, the potential effects of the perma-
nent provisons should be analyzed and understood because the provi-
sions could technically come into effect with the expiration of current 
agricultural legislation, unless they are suspended or other permanent 
legislation is passed.202
A. Key Differences Between the “Permanent” Farm Bill Provisions and Recent 
Farm Bill Legislation 
 Two major systems of domestic price supports have been used in 
United States agriculture over the last seventy-five years that differ in 
many ways.203 Both systems—the loan-based system in effect from 1933 
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to 1972 and the payment-based system in effect from 1973 onward— 
offer different types of programs and emphasize fundamentally distinct 
goals for American agriculture.204 Prior to 1973, farm policy aimed to 
prevent overproduction, limit the amount of agricultural product reach-
ing the market by idling land, and encourage storage of crops in times 
of plenty.205 In a complete reversal of policy, post-1973 farm policies 
sought to “giv[e] farmers incentive to produce as much as possible.”206
 Congress tailored the types of programs offered within these two 
systems to accomplish completely different objectives.207 Pre-1973 legis-
lation sought to curtail production and programs implemented at the 
time—such as non-recourse loans, grain storage linked to the Ever-
Normal Granary, acreage allotments for production control, and the 
use of marketing quotas—reflected this goal.208 Furthermore, the use 
of parity indices emphasizing farmers’ buying power and the fact that 
commodity subsidies were first adopted during the Great Depression 
suggest that the health of the rural, agricultural sector provided the 
original impetus for use of domestic price supports.209 Conversely, 
Congress implemented different programs when seeking to encourage 
production, meet global demand, and avoid grain shortages.210 Pro-
grams of this latter type—including direct and cyclical payments based 
on target prices, market loss assistance payments, marketing loans, and 
loan deficiency payments—ultimately have been used to maintain a 
disproportionate share of world markets, thus coming under heavy 
scrutiny in the Upland Cotton decision.211
B. Reimplementing the Pre-1973 System Would Rectify Certain  
Domestic Market Dysfunctions 
 In The Omnivore’s Dilemma, Michael Pollan argues that the loan-
based price support systems in effect before 1973 regulated markets by 
creating a price “floor” that placed a check on overproduction.212 In 
1973, the agricultural price support programs used by the USDA 
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changed from a largely loan-based system created to limit agricultural 
production to a payment-based system designed to encourage it.213 The 
nonrecourse loans, grain storage, and acreage allotments commonly 
implemented before 1973 and found in the permanent provisions of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and the Agricultural Act of 
1949 kept grain off the market and prevented prices from falling too 
steeply.214 In contrast, programs created after 1973, including those set 
out in the FAIR Act and the 2002 Act, emphasized payments based on 
target prices and market loss, and as a consequence encouraged as 
much production as possible and further depressed prices.215
 Having moved away from a loan-based system of domestic support, 
it follows that returning to it—or some variation of it—would cure some 
of the problems caused by the overproduction of agricultural commodi-
ties in the United States.216 Acreage allotments and marketing quotas 
could control production by setting projected limits on acreage and 
could discourage excessive production by penalizing non-compliant 
farmers.217 Mechanisms such as nonrecourse loans backed by crop-
storage provisions would even out prices by supporting farmers and pre-
venting the “dumping” of crops on depressed markets.218 Used together, 
these programs could remedy the ills of overproduction triggered in a 
payment-based system.219
 If adopted, the permanent provisions in the 1938 and 1949 Acts 
would almost certainly need modification to increase their effective-
ness.220 For example, the USDA continues to calculate the parity index 
by measuring farmers’ buying power based partly on prices during the 
period from 1910 to 1914.221 Using an index other than parity might 
better account for differences in technological capability.222 A price 
support program could technically be created using “any other index 
. . . Congress sees fit to pass, the President sees fit to enact and the 
USDA sees fit to administer.”223 Other additions may also prove neces-
sary, especially since crops such as sugar, soybeans, and rice were not 
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included under the permanent provisions, but have since increased in 
prominence.224
 Even without adopting the permanent provisions as they stand, it is 
likely that a domestic support system designed with some pre-1973 con-
trols would curb overproduction. Acreage allotments and marketing 
quotas control production by limiting the acreage dedicated to growing 
certain commodities and punishing those who do not comply.225 Use of 
these controls might help prevent overproduction, even if price-
contingent, payment-based subsidies are used.226 The switch from pay-
ment- to loan-based systems might have the same effect without acreage 
allotments because removing guaranteed payments would decrease in-
centives to overproduce.227 Reverting to a loan-based system of domes-
tic support may not, however, remedy all adverse effects associated with 
twenty-five years of payment-based domestic support.228 Certain conse-
quences, including the deterioration of rural communities, the loss of 
family farms, the environmental harms of intensive farming, and any 
economic damage to foreign countries disadvantaged by American ag-
ricultural subsidies, may not be fully remedied without separate initia-
tives falling outside the provisions of the farm bill.229
C. Using the Pre-1973 Price Support System Encourages Compliance  
with WTO Trade Agreements 
 The potential for reverting to the “permanent provisions” deserves 
consideration for another reason—the permanent legislation provided 
in the 1938 and 1949 Acts may not comply with the terms of the WTO 
Agriculture and SCM Agreements, leading to the potential for future 
conflicts with other countries.230 This analysis may ultimately appear on 
the agenda, regardless of whether it is included in any currently pend-
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ing legislation, because the failure to pass a new farm bill means that 
the permanent provisions come into effect.231
1. The Current Payment-Based System of Domestic Supports Violates 
WTO Trade Rules 
 Under the rules set out in the SCM Agreement, income supports 
decoupled from prices and production levels are allowed “green box” 
subsidies.232 Trade-distorting subsidies, such as those tied to production 
or market price, are prohibited “amber box” subsidies and may only be 
used up to the amount of a country’s allotted AMS.233 If “amber box” 
subsidies are restricted in order to decrease market impact, they consti-
tute “blue box” subsidies, and are not subject to reductions.234 Restric-
tions for “blue box” subsidies can be accomplished by basing payments 
on fixed area and yields, or by setting them at eighty-five percent or less 
of production base levels, as mandated in the Agriculture Agree-
ment.235
 In the United States—Upland Cotton decision, the WTO panel found 
that certain types of agricultural subsidies in the FAIR and 2002 Acts 
violated WTO rules.236 The Upland Cotton decision found that market-
ing loans, market loss assistance payments, and counter-cyclical pay-
ments counted as price-contingent “amber box” subsidies, but that PFC 
payments, direct payments, and crop insurance payments did not.237 
The panel determined that these price supports distorted trade, and 
that the United States was obligated to remove the subsidies or mitigate 
their adverse effects.238 Replacing some or all of these programs with 
pre-1973 loan-based price supports might enable the United States to 
comply with the provisions of the SCM and Agriculture Agreements. 
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2. Programs Used in the Pre-1973 Loan-Based Domestic Support 
System Limit Overproduction and May Facilitate Compliance with 
WTO Trade Rules 
 Major provisions of the pre-1973 commodity programs include 
acreage allotments, marketing quotas, and warehouse storage of com-
modities in conjunction with nonrecourse loans.239 The SCM Agree-
ment applies to loans and payments in considering whether something 
constitutes a subsidy.240 For example, the Upland Cotton decision estab-
lished that both payments and gains from loans could constitute “am-
ber box” subsidies.241 Therefore, it is not possible to make a simple 
conclusion as to whether the pre-1973 system would violate WTO trade 
rules simply because it is “loan-based” —the characteristics of the pro-
grams must be considered separately.242
 Certain features of the pre-1973 support system are not relevant to 
WTO consideration under the SCM Agreement because they constitute 
internal controls that do not involve financial contribution.243 Acreage 
allotments are internal controls, used to manage production levels by 
attempting to regulate the number of acres of certain crops that can be 
planted in a given year.244 Marketing quotas impose penalties on those 
failing to abide by acreage allotments and are the opposite of financial 
support.245 The main program in the pre-1973 system that would fall 
under WTO regulation is the provision for nonrecourse loans.246 As 
structured in the permanent provisions, the nonrecourse loans proba-
bly would fall in the limited “amber box” of subsidies.247 Since the level 
of support for these loans was calculated based on the parity index, 
which took into account “the commodity’s most recent 10-year-average 
farm price,” the subsidies are tied to market prices.248 Furthermore, 
although “in many years, producers had to comply with planting re-
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strictions to obtain price support loans,” it is unclear whether such re-
strictions would classify nonrecourse loans as “blue box” subsidies not 
subject to limits.249
 Nonrecourse loans offered under the pre-1973 farm bills also bear 
some resemblance to the marketing loan and deficiency payment pro-
grams in the 1996 and 2002 farm bills, and the loans could arguably be 
considered price-contingent on the same grounds.250 Marketing loans 
enabled farmers to store crops when prices were low; nonrecourse loans 
were given to farmers in exchange for storing their crops in the Ever-
Normal Granary when prices were low—both systems kept crop sur-
pluses off the market.251 Farmers receiving marketing loans could repay 
the loans at world market prices when they were lower than loan repay-
ment rates, thus obtaining marketing loan gains.252 Similarly, nonre-
course borrowers had the option of forfeiting their crops, presumably 
worth less than the loans, instead of paying off their complete debt.253
 The Upland Cotton decision found that marketing loans caused seri-
ous prejudice under articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement and 
were “amber box” subsidies because they were price-contingent where 
the amount of the marketing loan gain varied according to the difference 
between the marketing loan rate and the world price.254 Since nonrecourse 
loans resemble marketing loans in so many ways, similar analysis could 
be applied in determining their subsidy type. A farmer utilizing nonre-
course loans would technically receive a “payment” if the farmer chose 
to forfeit his crops because the loan amount retained from the Com-
modity Credit Corporation would presumably be higher than the mar-
ket price of the commodity.255 These gains would also constitute price-
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contingent “amber box” subsidies because the amount the farmer stood 
to “gain” could vary according to the market price of the commodity.256
 If nonrecourse loans qualify as “amber box” subsidies, they could 
potentially cause violations of the Agriculture Agreement, if they exceed 
allowed support levels.257 In this respect, nonrecourse loans resemble 
other price-contingent subsidies—such as marketing loans, which were 
found to cause price suppression in the Upland Cotton decision—and 
would be subject to the AMS cap.258 In fact, even if subsidies are in com-
pliance with the Agriculture Agreement, article 13 of the Agreement, 
which exempted permitted subsidies from action for a set period of 
time, expired in 2003 and compliant subsidies could still face challenges 
if they are excessive.259 To avoid this result, if the amount to be granted 
in nonrecourse “amber box” subsidies is excessive or exceeds the AMS 
cap, Congress would either need to include and abide by a circuit-breaker 
as in previous farm bill language, or else alter the permanent provisions 
to ensure WTO compliance.260
3. Taking into Account Loan-Based Domestic Support Systems Provides 
at Least Two Possible Options for Limiting Overproduction and 
Promoting WTO Compliance 
 The loan-based permanent provisions in the 1938 and 1949 Acts 
provide insights into alternatives to the proposed revisions to the 2007 
farm bill. Because the goal of the pre-1973 system was to control pro-
duction and the goal of the post-1973 system was to encourage it, it is 
only natural that using the production-limiting controls from the pre-
1973 system might better facilitate WTO compliance.261 Using the pro-
grams available under the pre-1973 system—acreage allotments and 
marketing quotas, grain storage, and nonrecourse loans—alone or in 
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combination with features of the post-1973 system would be more com-
patible with WTO trade rules because controlling production would 
ultimately prevent overproduction of commodities and depression of 
world prices.262
 One potential method of encouraging WTO compliance would be 
to implement the pre-1973 loan-based system as it stands in the perma-
nent provisions. This would involve the use of acreage allotments, mar-
keting quotas, and nonrecourse loans.263 Although nonrecourse loans 
might exceed permitted AMS levels if they are classified as “amber box” 
subsidies, the production-controlling aspects of the pre-1973 system— 
the acreage allotments in conjunction with the penalties accompanying 
the adoption of marketing quotas—would potentially decrease incen-
tives to overproduce, especially since penalties imposed could poten-
tially outweigh compensation received for the sale of additional crops.264
 Another way to avoid the possibility of a WTO violation completely 
would be to use a hybrid approach consisting only of programs that are 
compatible with the SCM and Agriculture Agreements.265 Such a sys-
tem would include only “green” or “blue box” subsidies not subject to 
limits.266 By combining production-limiting features from the perma-
nent provisions with the allowed, non-price-contingent price supports 
identified in the Upland Cotton decision, it is possible to envision a com-
pletely WTO-compliant system.267 Such a system could involve some 
combination of the permanent provisions’ acreage allotments and 
market quotas with more recent programs’ PFC payments or direct 
payments that were deemed permissible by the WTO. A hybrid system 
of this type would meet several policy goals: supporting farmers, ensur-
ing WTO compliance, and providing sufficient resources for feeding 
the nation by creating mechanisms that could more easily limit produc-
tion, and allow for variable incentive levels for production that could be 
more easily adjusted as needed.268
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 For the most part, the most recently passed farm bill legislation 
looks substantively similar to the 2002 Act, so it remains to be seen 
whether future agricultural legislation will ever benefit from imple-
menting elements of the pre-1973 loan-based system.269 Lawmakers’ 
reluctance to consider this a viable possibility may ultimately work to 
the detriment of American farm policy. 
Conclusion 
 Analyzing pre-1973 loan-based systems of agricultural price sup-
port is ultimately important for two reasons. First, understanding the 
purpose these systems served and how they functioned provides valu-
able insights on potential mechanisms available for shaping future farm 
legislation. Since the aims of agricultural legislation in the United 
States have historically had at least two different objectives, using fea-
tures of both systems may allow Congress to compromise and come up 
with a system that addresses both goals. Adopting a loan-based system 
similar to the ones used before 1973, or even integrating elements of 
such a system, makes sense from both a policy and a legal perspective 
because such programs focused on controlling crop production. In ad-
dition to remedying domestic harms caused by the payment-based sys-
tems used after 1973, which encouraged overproduction, implement-
ing features of a loan-based system would allow the United States to 
continue to support its farmers while encouraging compliance with 
WTO trade rules. There are at least two possible alternatives that may 
lead to this result. Furthermore, in the event that no new agricultural 
legislation is passed, the loan-based permanent provisions contained in 
the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938 and the Agriculture Act of 1949 
apply to American domestic supports; therefore, it is worthwhile to 
consider whether this system is compatible with the SCM and Agricul-
ture Agreements in order to prevent future challenges in the WTO. 
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